Caleb Suresh Motupalli v. Controller, CMA (PT) No. 2 of 2024 2025:MHC:293

1. INTRODUCTION

The C.M.A. (PT) No. 2 of 2024 (The High Court of Judicature at Madras, 29th January 2025, 2025:MHC:293) in the case of Caleb Suresh Motupalli v. Controller of Patents provides an important evaluation of the patentability of complex inventions, including those involving Artificial Intelligence (for short ‘AI’), under the Patents Act, 1970 (India) (for short ‘the ACT’). Patent Application No. 5606/CHENP/2012 was filed in the Indian Patent Office having the title ‘Necktie Persona-Extender/Environment-integrator and method for Super-Augmenting a Persona to Manifest a Pan-Environment Super-Cyborg’. The Controller, via order dated Oct 27th, 2021, rejected an appeal that was filed under Section 117A. Appeals to High Court of the ACT. This judgment covers the procedural maintainability of an appeal against a review order and substantively assesses the invention against the stringent statutory requirements of sufficiency of disclosure, clarity of claims, and patentable subject matter under the ACT. The core of the legal question was Section 10(4) (‘Enablement’), Section 10(5) ('Clarity'), and Section 3(k) (‘computer programs per se’) in the scope of review under Section 77(1)(f) of the ACT. This case again highlights the high bar set by the courts to prove technical effect and enablement of inventions falling in the realm of human-AI nexus.

---

FACTS OF THE CASE

An Indian Patent Application No. 5606/CHENP/2012 dated June 27^th, 2012 was filled by Caleb Suresh Motupalli (‘the appellant’). This was a National Phase entry claiming priority from a US application and in line with PCT Application No. PCT/IN2010/000669. The invention claimed a method to merge human intelligence with AI into a “super-augmented persona”.
The First Examination Report (for short ‘FER’) was issued raising objections of lack of inventive step, industrial applicability and non-patentability under Section 3(k) and Section 3(m). on August 30^th, 2018. The appellant responded with the amendments in the claims.

Hearing was conducted and the Controller passed an order dated April 21^st, 2021 rejecting the application for non-compliance with the requirements of multiple Sections under the ACT.

• Section 10(4) (sufficiency of disclosure),
• Section 10(5) (clarity),
• Section 59 (scope of amendment),
• Section 2(1) (ja) (inventive step) and
• Section 3(k) and 3(m).

The appellant filed a review petition in terms of Section 77(1)(f) and (g) of the ACT against aforesaid order on May 11^th, 2021.  A second hearing was held by the Controller and by the impugned order dated Oct 27^th, 2021 again rejected the patent application. The objections in earlier FER were cited again and additionally Section 3(b) non-compliance was cited.

The present appeal, the appellant challenged order-in-review before the Hon’ble High Court of Madras.

PETITIONER CONTENTION

The appellant appeared as a party-in-person and has put forward various arguments against the decision of the Controller:

○ Sufficiency of Disclosure:

The appellant submitted that the requirement of the Section 10(4)(a) under the ACT has fulfilled, and the complete specification sufficiently describes the invention to enable a person skilled in the art to work the invention. He also gave reliance on the case Novartis AG v. Union of India¹, to state that the specification has to be formed keeping usage view by a person skilled in the art.

He also argued, referring In re Naquin², to confirm who can be the person skilled in the art. Wherein the persona shall be a team of experts in the relevant fields for multi-faceted, inter-disciplinary inventions such as the one claimed by the appellant in current patent application.

○ Clarity and Scope of Claims:

The appellant further submitted, the claims were drafted in Jepson format (i.e. Improvement Claims). Those were mentioned to clearly define the prior art apart from the inventive advancement. The claims by nature were lengthy and complex, but it was justified by the all-inclusive nature of the invention, and was clearly intended to provide clarity, and not extending the scope (original) beyond what was permissible under Section 59(1) of the ACT.

○ Inventive Step and Patentable Subject Matter:

The appellant relied on Ferid Allani v. Union of India³ and CRI Guidelines, 2017 to argue that the invention had a substantial technical effect by altering the way the user interacted with the physical and digital environment and therefore was not merely an algorithm or a computer program per se which are excluded subject matter under Section 3(k) of the ACT. The appellant also argued that his invention provided a tangible technical advancement through the provision of non-intrusive Human-AI integration to solve the problem of ‘n-Entropy’ (loss of human agency).

○ Violation of Natural Justice:

The appellant raised question on getting new objection under Section 3(b) and at time of hearing stage. The appellant claimed this was discretionary action by the Controller which were curtailing appellant’s right to have fair opportunity to deal with the objections.

RESPONDENT CONTENTION

The O/o Controller of Patents was defended by Counsel Panel for the impugned order with the following counter arguments:

○ No Inventive Step:

The respondent submitted that the claimed invention, when considered in the light of the combined teaching of the prior art documents with Disclosure 1 to Disclosure 8, did not involve Section 2(1) (ja), - an inventive step. These prior arts already revealed methods of virtual environments, black-box transformation and cognitive learning systems.

○ Insufficiency and non-preciseness:

It was further argued that the complete specification, Sections 10(4) and 10(5) mandatory test evaluation outcome was negative. The respondent argued that the specification was filled with ambiguous, undefined terms and biblical references, and that the specification failed to provide a clear and complete description. It didn't make the abstract idea into a patent-eligible, practical application, making the claims vague and not fairly based on the disclosure.

○ Non-Patentable Subject Matter:

The respondent argued that the invention, lacking a definite set of steps performed by a computer and physical technical application, was squarely covered by the exclusions under Sections 3(k) (computer program per se) and 3(m) (mental act). The inter-disciplinary nature of the invention did not cure the fundamental ineligibility.

○ Appeal maintainability:

As a preliminary objection, it was submitted that the appeal was not maintainable under Section 117A of the ACT in as much as an order passed in a review petition under Section 77(1)(f), which was out of the scope of the statute as its non appealable order.

ANALYSIS OF CASE

The High Court’s analysis was twofold:

• first on the procedural issue of maintainability of the appeal and

• The second part of the analysis focused on the merits of the patent application. 

Maintainability of Appeal:

The Court first examined the maintainability of an appeal under Section 117A against a review order. The Court noted that Section 117A (2) provides an exhaustive list of sections under which an order of the Controller is appealable. It was important to note that this list does not include Section 77(1)(f) of the ACT, which allows the Controller to review his own decision.

The Court also observed that the appellant failed to establish any grounds available under ORDER-XLVII., Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, such as a clear and obvious mistake in the record. Instead of rejecting the review petition on this ground, the Controller had proceeded to make a full re-examination. The

The Court however held that the appeal was liable to be dismissed at the threshold on the ground that it was not maintainable.

Merits Analysis:

Without prejudice to its finding on maintainability, the Court proceeded to examine the impugned order on its merits.

• Sufficiency of Disclosure (Section 10(4)):

From the perspective of a person skilled in the art (a team of experts in AI, black-box transformation, etc.), the Court found the specification to be critically lacking. The board identified that the appellant had only “coalesced disclosures” in context with the prior art, in particular regarding black-box-based techniques, missing a clear and specific explanation of how the known techniques' transformation to new “persona extension” can be accomplished. The Court held that the specification required undue experimentation and inventive faculty from the person skilled in the art, placing reliance on No-Fume Ltd. v. Frank Pitchford & Co. Ltd.⁴ It was found that the description of features such as the “Christocratic Necked Service Oriented Architecture (CNSOA)” was not technically enabled. The invention, thus, did not meet the requirements of enablement under 35 United States Code § 10(4)(a) or of disclosure of the best mode under 35 United States Code § 10(4)(b). 

• Clarity and Fair Basis (Section 10(5))

The Court agreed with the Controller’s finding that the claims were vague, unintelligible, and not fairly based on the specification. In the case of the General Tire & Rubber Company,⁵ it was pointed out that the specification failed to disclose a workable embodiment, and, therefore, the claims were unsupported and did not clearly define the monopoly sought. 

• Patentable Subject Matter (Section 3(k)):

Applying the test set out in Microsoft Licensing Technology LLC v. Assistant Controller of Patents⁶ the Court held that the invention had no demonstrable technical effect or improvement on the hardware. The invention was therefore an abstract and theoretical idea, since the specification gave no working example, and was clearly covered by the exclusion under Section 3(k) of the ACT.

JUDGEMENT

The Hon’ble High Court of Madras dismissed the appeal C.M.A. (PT) No. 2 of 2024 and upheld the Controller’s refusal of the patent application.
The ratio decidendi of the judgment rested on two main pillars.

• The Court, on a procedural ground, first held that the appeal was not maintainable under Section 117A of the ACT. No statutory provisions with regard to the review under Section 77(1)(f) of the Act - if an order had been passed by the Controller. The appellant had not made out a case for review under the grounds laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

• The Court held, as a second point without prejudice to the merits, that the patent application itself was defective. It found that the invention failed to meet the statutory requirements in several aspects:

- Section 10(4)(a) & (b):

• The sufficiency of disclosure is an important prerequisite for a person skilled in the art to work on it using the complete specification. The best method for performing the invention also needs to be clearly disclosed;

- Section 10(5):

• The claims were found to be ambiguous, unclear, and unfairly based on the matter disclosed in the specification.

- Section 3(k):

• The invention was considered to be a computer program per se, as it was an abstract idea with no proven technical effect or contribution.

The Court concluded that there would be no interference with the impugned order of the Controller dated October 27th, 2021, given the background of multiple failures. The Court dismissed the appeal.

CONCLUSION

In the case of Caleb Suresh Motupalli v. Controller of Patents, the judgment becomes an important one especially for inventions in the areas of artificial intelligence (AI) and human computer interaction that is emerging in the recent times. The case highlights the need for a demonstrable and practical requirement for sufficient disclosure as demanded by the judiciary. This judgment sets forth a clear indication for the inventors and those applying for patents that although the abstract idea may be innovative in character, it needs to be put in terms of a tangible embodiment with technical clarity in order to meet the requirements of the ACT.

It becomes evident from the judgment that the standards of sufficient disclosure under Section 10(4) of the ACT are not easy to meet, with the possibility of aggregation of known techniques being cautioned against.

Even more importantly, the case supports the understanding that under Section 3(k) of the ACT, there must be a substantial technical effect above the inherent technical effects of a computer program. This case is useful for all future patent applications regarding artificial intelligence as it offers guidance on how patent applications should be drafted. This includes drafting claims that provide technical effects and including working examples to demonstrate that the patentability landscape in India is favorable.